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1 Introduction
Richer people are healthier, happier and live longer. Little is known, however, about the
causal mechanisms underlying this important correlation of wealth and health. Money
might buy health, but health might also reversely affect expenditure and income gen-
eration. And third factors such as preferences or life events are likely to affect both
simultaneously. The broad existing literature on the wealth-health relationship is skepti-
cal about causal effect of wealth or wealth shocks on adult health in developed countries.
So far such effects have been documented only for poor retirees in poor countries.1 In this
paper I exploit stock market fluctuations in the wealth of elderly US retirees as a source
of exogenous wealth shocks. Contrary to the existing literature I find that wealth shocks
strongly affect physical health, mental health and survival rates of elderly retirees in the
US.
Over the past two decades every third retiree household in the US held part of its wealth
in stocks. And these households invested on average about 20% of their overall remain-
ing life-time wealth in such risky asset. As a consequence the booms and busts in the US
stock market over the past 15 years generated dramatic unexpected gains and losses in the
wealth of stock holding retirees. I analyze this natural experiment using rich micro-data
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is representative of the elderly
US population and provides panel data on all wealth components including stock holdings
as well as information on physical health, mental health and mortality.
I construct wealth shocks as the interaction of stock holdings with the stock market
change. These constructed wealth shocks are highly predictive of changes in reported
wealth. And they strongly affect the health of elderly retirees who are of average age 75
in the HRS. A 10% change in life-time wealth over a two year period is associated with a
change of 2-3% of a standard deviation in four different health measures: a physical health
index, self-reported health, mental health and the probability to survive to the next inter-
view two years ahead. This means that among 100 retirees losing 10% of their remaining
life-time wealth 2.5 will develop an additional health condition and one additional retiree
will not survive the next two years (given a baseline 2-year mortality rate of 12%). The
analysis of individual health conditions reveals a plausible pattern underlying the effect on
physical health. Effects are strongest for hypertension, which we would expect to be most
responsive in the short run. Smaller effects I find for heart diseases which are typically
caused by high blood pressure. And there are no effects on arthritis, diabetes, lung disease
and cancer which in general take more than two years to be affected by external factors.
Compared to the cross-sectional relationship of wealth and health the estimated effects
are large in magnitude.
For a causal interpretation of these estimates constructed wealth shocks must be inde-
1For reviews of the literature see Smith (1999), Deaton (2003), Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006),
Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogl (2011).
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pendent of any unobserved heterogeneity in health changes. Stock market changes are
exogenous for the individual retiree but this is not the case for stock holdings. More ed-
ucated, wealthier and more risk loving individuals typically hold larger fractions of their
wealth in stocks. And the observation period covers only a limited number of on average
slightly positive stock market changes. As a consequence constructed wealth shocks are
likely to be correlated with unobserved determinants of stock holdings. For this reason
I control separately for the fraction of wealth held in stocks. In other words, I compare
health changes for individuals with the same amount of stocks at different points in the
stock market cycle. One might still worry that results are driven by a correlation of the
stock market with investor types or with the typical investor’s health profile. Several ro-
bustness checks show that this is unlikely to be the case. This suggests that constructed
wealth shocks indeed cause the observed changes in health.
For the interpretation of this relationship as the effects of wealth shocks on health it
is further necessary to control for effects of the stock market or the macroeconomic envi-
ronment that do not run through stock wealth. I argue that retirees without stocks are
at least equally strongly affected by potential direct effects as those with stocks. I include
time effects to absorb any macroeconomic shocks common to both groups.
Despite a broad existing literature positive effects of wealth shocks on elderly health have
been documented so far only for poor retirees in Russia (Jensen and Richter 2003) and
South Africa (Case 2004). As Cutler, Lleras-Muney and Vogl (2011) summarize in a recent
literature review, ”... [A] preponderance of evidence suggests that in developed countries
today, income does not have a large causal effect on adult health”. The most prominent
papers providing this evidence can be summarized by three main approaches.
A first set of papers uses approaches related to Granger-causality (Adams et al. 2003;
Smith 2005; Michaud and Van Soest 2008). Using the HRS data these papers show that
wealth changes and lagged wealth conditional on socio-economic controls do not predict
health changes at the micro-level. I discuss these studies in detail below. Their focus on
a younger working-age population as well as measurement error in self-reported wealth
and short-term responses in health seem to be likely explanations of why their results are
different from the findings presented in this paper.
Another set of papers analyze aggregate time series of income and health at the state
or cohort level (Ruhm 2000; Deaton and Paxson 2001; Deaton and Paxson 2004; Snyder
and Evans 2006; Adda et al. 2009). None of these papers find evidence of a positive
relationship of income changes and health changes at the macro-level. Endogeneity and
measurement errors are less of an issue in aggregate data. Group averages are independent
of individual-specific endogeneity and cancel out random measurement error.2 However,
aggregate income changes might be correlated with macro shocks that also have non-
2Aggregation at the state or cohort level is equivalent to instrumental variable estimation with a set of
state or cohort dummies as instruments (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
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income effects on health. This invalidation of the exclusion restriction, as the authors of
these papers note, makes it difficult to infer causal effects from these findings.3
A third set of papers exploits lottery winnings as a source of exogenous variation in wealth
(Lindahl 2005; Gardner and Oswald 2007; Apouey and Clark 2009). These papers find
positive effect on mental health, while results are less conclusive for physical health. A
general challenge of lottery studies are small sample sizes and in particular few observa-
tions of significant winnings. Further, only positive wealth shocks are observed.
In the present study I combine these different approaches. I merge the rich micro-data
from the HRS with aggregate stock market changes to introduce a source of exogenous
macro shocks. The interaction of these macro shocks with a micro-level measure of the
exposure to these shocks, the amount of stock holdings, allows to better control for poten-
tial non-wealth effects of the macroeconomic environment. The resulting setup is in spirit
a large-scale lottery framework that allows to analyze the causal effect of wealth gains and
losses on elderly health in the US.
How plausible are the effects that I find? Should we expect positive physical health
effects found for poor retirees in poor countries to carry over to wealthy retirees in the
US? Health inputs like medical treatment, medication or mere calorie intake might be
affected by wealth shocks for poor retirees in Russia or South Africa. But this is probably
less of an issue for stock holding US pensioners, who have enough money left to afford
basic pills and food even after a considerable wealth loss. Further, Medicare covers the
entire 65+ population in the US so that wealth shocks do not affect basic health insurance
coverage unlike for displaced workers. Consumption of healthy food and purchase of a
healthy environment could be more responsive determinants of retiree health in the US
than basic health inputs. But two years might not be enough time for consumption to
affect health outcomes as dramatically as observed.
Other plausible channels are psychological factors such as happiness about pleasant trips
that were not affordable before or financial worries and sadness about a lost fortune that
had been accumulated as inheritance for the grandchildren. A broad literature in medicine,
psychology and biology has documented effects of psychological stress on coronary artery
diseases, clinical depression and mortality (Strike and Steptoe 2004). Positive emotions,
on the other hand, were found to have positive effects on these health outcomes (for a
review see Chida and Steptoe, 2008). In the HRS data I find strong wealth shock effects
on high blood pressure and mental health and smaller effects on heart problems. This
is exactly the kind of health response the bio-medical literature would predict if wealth
shocks have an effect on psychological stress.4
3For a discussion of Ruhm (2000) and of Snyder and Evans (2006) see also Miller et al. (2009) and
Handwerker (2008), respectively.
4The responsiveness of elderly mental health to income related shocks has also been documented by
Grip et al. (2009).
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The focus of this study on elderly retirees has several advantages. Compared to younger
adults retirees have a lot of wealth and heterogeneity in wealth composition so there is
a lot of wealth variation to exploit. Further, as they no longer participate in the labor
market effects of stock market shocks running through labor demand are limited. That
makes it easier to separate wealth shock effects from other confounding factors. Last,
at an average age of 75 the analyzed retirees are closer to the margin of severe health
problems (including death) than younger adults. This makes it more likely for effects of
wealth shocks on latent health to become manifest in observable health outcomes.
However, caution must be exercised when extrapolating from my estimates to other set-
tings. Effects are identified only for stock holding retirees who are on average wealthier,
healthier and less risk-averse than those without stocks. Further the estimated effects
might not be representative for younger adults who are in better physical shape and flexi-
ble in terms of their labor supply to compensate a given wealth shock.5 Last, my estimates
represent the short-term effects of wealth shocks. They might not be representative for the
long-run effects of gradually accumulating wealth differences. The comparison with the
cross-sectional relationship of wealth and health indeed suggests that the long-run wealth
elasticity of health is smaller and more homogeneous across health conditions than the
estimated causal effects of wealth shocks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the identification
strategy, Section III describes the data, Section IV the empirical specification. Section V
presents the findings and Section VI concludes.
2 Identification
This paper seeks to estimate the causal effect of wealth shocks on health. The difficulty
of this task is the endogeneity of wealth. Wealth shocks might not only affect health, but
health shocks are also likely to reversely affect expenditures and third factors might influ-
ence both wealth and health simultaneously. Further, wealth is typically measured with
noise leading to attenuation bias. This measurement error problem tends to aggravate in
first differences. For these two reasons the simple regression of health changes on wealth
changes from observational data might not tell us a lot about the causal effect of wealth
shocks on health outcomes.
The ideal experiment to solve the endogeneity problem would be a lottery that randomly
assigns wealth losses and gains to people and measures their health before and some time
after the assignment. This paper exploits the booms and busts of the US stock market
over the past two decades as a natural experiment that generated considerable wealth
5Sullivan and von Wachter (2008), however, provide related evidence for younger adults. They show
that exogenous job displacements dramatically increase the mortality hazard of male US workers during
the years following the job loss. The authors interpret their findings to be consistent with job loss ”causing
acute stress, which may substantially raise the mortality hazard in the short term.”
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gains and losses for retirees owning stocks.6 This natural experiment comes quite close to
the ideal setting. As stock market changes are largely unpredictable for retirees without
insider information holding stocks is equivalent to buying lottery tickets.
I construct stock market induced wealth shocks (hereafter constructed wealth shocks) as
the interaction of the lagged fraction of life-time wealth held in stocks with stock market
changes.
si,t−1
Wi,t−1
∆SPt
SPt−1
(1)
where si,t−1 are past wave’s stock holdings, Wi,t−1 is a measure of past wave’s life-time
wealth (see below) and ∆SPtSPt−1 the percentage change in the S&P500 stock market index
between two waves. For example, an individual with 20% life-time wealth held in stocks
in the past wave and a 50% stock market increase between the past and the current wave
is assigned a 10% positive wealth shock.
To estimate the effects of wealth shocks on health outcomes I regress health changes
directly on constructed wealth shocks while controlling for the main effects and demo-
graphic covariates:
∆Hi,t = α+ β
si,t−1
Wi,t−1
∆SPt
SPt−1
+ γ
si,t−1
Wi,t−1
+ ϑt + δXi,t + i,t (2)
where Hi,t are different health measures,
si,t−1
Wi,t−1
∆SPt
SPt−1 are constructed wealth shocks, ϑt
are year fixed effects and Xi,t predetermined demographic controls. Health measures
are regressed in first differences because wealth shocks can only explain changes but not
past levels in health. Taking first differences therefore cleans the dependent variable of
unexplainable variation while it does not reduced the number of observations since the
construction of wealth shocks already requires a lag.
For the interpretation of β as the causal effect of wealth shocks on health two condi-
tions must be satisfied. Constructed wealth shocks are causal only if they are independent
of any unobserved heterogeneity in health changes. Further, their effect on health cap-
tured by β must run exclusively through changes in stock wealth.
6To my knowledge Coile and Levine (2006) have been the first to exploit this natural experiment. They
analyze the impact of stock market movements on retirement decisions, comparing the effects of stock
market movements on retirement for groups that are relatively more and less likely to hold stocks. I
enhance their approach, using the exact fraction of wealth held in stocks instead of a binary indicator of
stock market exposure which increases the power of the analysis.
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2.1 Are constructed wealth shocks causal?
Stock market changes are largely unpredictable (for a review of the finance literature on
market efficiency see Malkiel [2003]) and therefore random for the individual retiree. How-
ever, the observation period covers only a limited number of on average slightly positive
stock market changes. As a consequence constructed wealth shocks are on average higher
(more positive) for those with more stocks. At the same time stock holdings are not ran-
dom. The richer, the more educated and the more risk loving typically hold larger fractions
of their wealth in stocks. This results in a correlation of constructed wealth shocks with
unobservable determinants of stock holdings. Regressing health measures in first differ-
ences cancels out unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. But determinants
of stock holdings might not only correlate with health levels but also with health profiles
over time so that first differences alone do not rule out potential endogeneity.7 Therefore
it is important to control separately for the lagged fraction of wealth held in stocks (
si,t−1
Wi,t−1 ).
This means I compare health changes for individuals with the same amount of stocks
at different points in the stock market cycle. Or in terms of the lottery analogy, I measure
the health response to lottery winnings and losses conditional on the amount of lottery
tickets bought. Still one might worry that the stock market is coincidentally correlated
with the health profiles of the typical stock-owning retiree. Or investor types might change
over time so that retirees with the same amount of stocks during a boom and during a
bust might not be comparable. I analyze and discuss these potential issues in detail in the
findings section when the main results are more easily at hand.
2.2 Are effects running exclusively through stock wealth?
Stock market changes might not only determine the valuation of stock holdings but also
correlate with prices of other non-stock wealth holdings such as bonds or real estate. A
way to test for such correlation is to look at the comovement of the stock market with the
wealth of households that do not own stocks. Figure 1 compares the S&P500 with the
coefficients from regressions of wealth changes on wave dummies for retirees with stocks
and without stocks in the previous period. For retirees with stocks they follow the up’s
and down’s in the S&P500.8 But for retirees without stocks wealth changes are positive in
all waves and seem uncorrelated with the stock market. More detailed regressions taking
into account the precise month of interviews are presented in the Findings section. Again,
the stock market is highly predictive for wealth changes of stock holders, while the effect
on wealth for those without stocks is essentially zero. This suggests that there is not much
7For example, individuals who anticipate a health risk might want to reduce financial risks and redis-
tribute their portfolio from stocks to safer assets. Or people with less education have more declining health
profiles due to worst health behavior and at the same time hold less stocks due to less financial literacy.
Given a limited number of on average positive stock market changes these examples of reverse causality
or simultaneity would imply a positive correlation of constructed wealth shocks and health changes.
8Notice that the majority of respondents in the last wave face a lower S&P500 than at their previous
wave’s interview (this is also evident in Figure 2) and thus a negative average wealth change is what one
should expect.
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an effect of the stock market on non-stock wealth.
But the stock market or more broadly the macroeconomic environment might also af-
fect health through non-wealth channels. For example, a macroeconomic environment in
which stock markets collapse might have negative effects on the individual’s employment
which would probably not only affect her wealth but also directly her health. As the sam-
ple is restricted to retiree households effects running through the individual’s employment
status are limited. But retirees might be troubled about their children becoming unem-
ployed or their grand children not finding a job after graduating from high school. Further
we could think of the provision of public goods that might depend on the macroeconomic
environment and have a direct effect on pensioners’ health. And retirees could be stressed
and fearing social instability when hearing apocalyptic news about the economy in the
media. However, it seems reasonable to assume that these direct effects are at least as
strong for retirees who do not hold stocks as for those with stocks. Retirees without stocks
tend to be poorer, less educated and more risk averse. If anything, they depend more on
public goods, suffer more from bad news and their children are the first to get fired when
it comes to mass lay-offs in a recession (Hoynes, Miller and Schaller, 2012). To control for
potential direct effects in a conservative way I therefore include time fixed effects (ϑt).
Before describing the data and the final empirical specification in detail a few issues
remain to be discussed.
2.3 Measurement and scaling issues
Changes in reported wealth are not only endogenous but also notorious for attenuation
bias due to measurement error. Constructed wealth shocks help to minimize this kind of
bias because they rely on levels instead of changes in self-reported wealth. Notice that the
other component of constructed wealth shocks, changes in the S&P500, represent average
stock market returns. Average returns do not account for individual portfolio composi-
tions which are not observed in the data. However, the resulting measurement error in
constructed wealth shocks is negatively correlated with actual returns but uncorrelated
with constructed wealth shocks, i.e. the regressor of interest. This kind of measurement
error – though occurring in the explanatory variable – only implies less precise estimates
but no attenuation towards zero.
Constructed wealth shocks under- or overestimate actual wealth shocks if retirees’ ex-
pectations of stock market returns systematically differ from zero. Luckily the HRS in-
cludes since 2002 a question about the likelihood that the stock market increases within
the following year. Figure A.1 in the Appendix plots monthly averages for this question
together with the S&P500. Expectations are strikingly low: even those with stocks ex-
pect on average only a 45-60% chance that the stock market will increase. Furthermore,
expectations seem to be slightly correlated with the stock market. Following Dominitz
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and Manski (2007) I transform expected probabilities about stock market increases into
expected stock market returns and adjust for them when constructing wealth shocks. As
expectations are only marginal compared to actual stock market changes their inclusion
decreases estimates only slightly. For better comparability of my results with other studies
I therefore do not include expectations in the baseline regressions.
Constructed changes in stock wealth (si,t−1 ∆SPtSPt−1 ) are divided, or rescaled, by a mea-
sure of life-time wealth (Wi,t−1), i.e. is the discounted sum of current wealth holdings
and expected future pension income (see Data section for details). The rationale behind
this rescaling is that the effect of a given wealth shock is likely to depend on the initial
wealth level. A $50,000 loss might not be noteworthy for the very rich but is painful for
the poorer. And what matters is not just what an individual possesses at the time of
the shock but also what she expects to earn in the future. If she has high annual income
and still many years to live a given wealth loss can be easily compensated by dissaving.
Taking into account not just current wealth but also future income makes sense especially
for retirees. They typically have constant pension income and a limited time horizon of
remaining years to live. An additional advantage of rescaling by life-time wealth instead
of current wealth is that life-time wealth has fewer zeros or negative values which have to
be excluded from the analysis. Results, however, are not driven by the inclusion of life-
time wealth. The overall effect pattern remains the same when rescaling wealth shocks by
current wealth instead of life-time wealth.
3 Data
The data used in this study come from the waves 4 to 10 of the Health and Retirement
Survey (HRS), covering the years 1998 to 2011.9 The HRS is a biannual panel that started
in 1992 with 12,654 individuals representing US adults of age 51 and older. In 1998 and
2004 new cohorts were added to keep the sample representative resulting in an extended
sample of about 22,000 individuals. Moreover, in 1998 the fraction of individual retirement
accounts invested in stocks, a variable that is central for my analysis, is introduced. Per
household one so-called financial respondent is interviewed about her and the other family
members’ income and wealth holdings. Other questionnaire items such as health measures
are reported by all household members. The sample of this study is restricted to financial
respondents, who report wealth and stock holdings and non-zero retirement income in the
previous wave, and their spouses if existent. Further I restrict the sample to singles and
couples who were retired in the previous wave, i.e. either (i) both financial respondent
and spouse were neither working for pay (i.e. neither working, nor part-time working, nor
partly retired) nor unemployed or (ii) both considered themselves completely retired. The
final regression sample consists of about 40,000 person-year observations, of which 20,000
refer to singles. The average age is 75.43 years, 63% of the sample are women and 82%
9The data is drawn from the RAND HRS file. Variables that are not included in the RAND file are
added from the HRS raw data.
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are white (see Table A.1 for further summary statistics).
The interview month is known, so that the HRS data can be matched to monthly stock
market data from the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index (S&P500).10 Constructed
wealth shocks are generated for financial respondents and matched to spouses. Interviews
which start in one month and end in a later month are dropped as well as spouse interviews
that are conducted in a different month from the financial respondent.
3.1 Wealth data
The HRS contains detailed information on income and wealth holdings. Financial infor-
mation is reported in exact amounts and unfolding response brackets are offered if exact
amounts are unknown. This study uses cleaned and partly imputed wealth data from the
RAND HRS file. Current household wealth (Ai,t) consists of net housing wealth, real estate
wealth, vehicles, business wealth, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), stocks and mu-
tual funds, checking and savings accounts, CDs, savings bonds and treasury bills, bonds,
other savings, and debts. Pension plans such as 401(k)s are not reported for retirees in the
HRS because these plans are usually cashed out or rolled over into an IRA upon retirement.
I construct a measure of life-time wealth (Wi,t) as the sum of current wealth and dis-
counted expected future income.
Wi,t = Ai,t + E(
T−t∑
τ=0
Yt+τ
(1 + r)t+τ
) (3)
with Yi,t income and r the real annual interest rate. Current wealth and past earnings
are well documented in the HRS. Fortunately, retiree income - consisting of pensions and
annuities (PIAi,t), old age social security (SSi,t) and veteran benefits (V etBeni,t) - can
be expected to stay constant (in real terms) after the first receipt until the individual’s
end of life. Hence we can take past year’s annual income from pensions, annuities, old
age social security and veteran benefits as the expectation for future income.11 Interest
rate expectations (set to 3%) are assumed to stay constant as well. Further, the survival
probability is needed. I calculate (τ)-year survival rates by age (t), gender (g) and 10-year
birth cohort (c) using the SSA life tables.
Wi,t = Ai,t + (SSi,t + PAIi,t + V etBeni,t)
T−t∑
τ=1
E(St+τ |ti, gi, ci)
(1 + r)t+τ
(4)
10The S&P500 is the weighted average of 500 of the biggest actively traded companies in the US and
therefore represent a broad indicator of the US stock market. However, using the Dow Jones Industrial
Average, which represents only 30 companies delivers similar results.
11The HRS reports monthly (past month’s) income which is multiplied by 12 to obtain future annual
income.
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Social security benefits pose a potential problem as there are financial incentives to delay
take-up to age 65 (Coile et al. 2002). For retirees below age 65 who do not report receiving
social security it is not clear whether they are postponing or whether they are not entitled
to social security payments. I present robustness checks excluding all households with one
or both spouses below age 65.
Different life expectancies within households, i.e. within couples, are a further compli-
cation. Typically wives can expect to survive their husbands, but it would be demanding
to calculate all different survival constellations and the corresponding exact survivor ben-
efit amounts. For simplicity a couple’s life-time wealth is calculated by applying the
couple’s mean life expectancy to the sum of the couple’s total annual income. Restricting
the sample to singles in order to avoid this simplified life-time wealth formula for cou-
ples does not affect the pattern of the estimated effects (see robustness checks). The same
holds true if I use current wealth (Ai,t) instead of life-time wealth to rescale wealth shocks.
A central ingredient for constructing wealth shocks is the amount of stock holdings. Direct
stock holdings are well documented in each wave, but they do not include stocks held in
IRAs. Retirees often hold considerable fractions of their wealth in (often various) IRAs.
To calculate the total amount of stock holdings it is therefore important to know the per-
centage of each IRA invested in stocks.
In 2006 and 2008 for each IRA the exact percentage invested in ’stocks and mutual funds’
is reported. In the 1998 to 2004 waves three categories indicate whether IRAs are invested
’mostly in stocks’, ’mostly in interest-earning assets’, or ’about evenly split’. I translate
these categories into 100%, 0%, and 50% invested in stocks, which results in roughly the
same investment distribution in 2004 as for the exact information in 2006 and 2008. The
assumption of a stable investment distribution between 2004 and 2006/2008 for US IRAs
is checked with data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a US representative
triennial survey with about 22,000 households per wave. The SCF reports exact informa-
tion on the IRA fraction invested in stock for 2004 and 2007. The cumulative distribution
function does not change significantly between SCF 2004 and SCF 2007, indicating that
IRA investment distributions in the US were indeed stable over that period.
Table 1 summarizes sample characteristics and main wealth measures per HRS wave (for
further wealth summary statistics see Table A.2 in the Appendix). In 2004 younger than
average cohorts are added, leading to discontinuous jumps in these measures. Retiree
rates increase with age, but even at age 70 for 30% of the households at least one spouse
is still in the labor force. The fourth and fifth row show the information available on
the fraction of IRAs invested in stocks and the respective imputed values. The regression
sample includes all households who were retired in the previous wave and reported wealth,
non-zero retiree income and stock holdings. In the regression sample on average about
half the life-time wealth is held in current wealth and about 1/3 of all households hold at
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least some stocks. Since wealth shocks are constructed for households with stocks, these
are the ’treated’. They are on average twice as wealthy as retirees without stocks and hold
about 20% of their life-time wealth in stocks.
The final two rows of Table 1 display average stock market changes between interviews and
the resulting constructed wealth shocks. The booms and busts around the New Economy
stock market bubble and the financial crisis, which are covered by the observation period,
can be clearly seen. Averages of constructed wealth shocks per wave roughly resemble
the average stock market change multiplied by the average fraction held in stocks in the
previous period.
Figure 2 plots constructed wealth shocks and the S&P500 over time. Each circle rep-
resent one household and is placed at the month of the interview. Wealth shocks roughly
range from -30% to +40%. These are dramatic changes. For a retiree who has about
10 years remaining to live a 10% loss in life-time wealth equals the amount of planned
expenditures for a whole year. If she is smoothing consumption, she will have to spend
10% less than planned every month until the end of her life. If a fixed part of her wealth is
planned for inheritance or emergencies, consumption has to decrease by even more. Notice
that these dramatic wealth shocks are constructed and might not correspond to changes in
reported wealth of similar size. Their predictive power is assessed in the Findings section.
3.2 Health data
I use different health measures from the HRS as dependent variables: A physical health
index, individual health conditions, self-reported health, self-reported change in health, a
mental health index as well as survival to the next interview. For better comparability
measures of bad health are inverted such that higher values of a measure always refer to
better health. This means that a positive coefficient on wealth shocks always refers to
an improvement in the respective health measure. For comparability of effect sizes across
measures which are reported on different scales and represent health circumstances of
different severity I also show results for ’probit-adapted’ health measures following an ap-
proach by van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008). This approach yields effects in terms
of standard deviations that additionally account for potential measure-specific non-linear
scaling.12 Summary statistics of original and transformed health measures are reported in
the Appendix, Table A.3.
The physical health index equals the sum of conditions which have ever been diagnosed
by a doctor according to the respondent. The HRS questionnaire includes seven physical
health conditions: high blood pressure, heart disease, stroke, arthritis, cancer, diabetes,
12I assign to the categories of each measure the expected value of a standard normal variable conditional
on being between the category’s lower and upper cut-off points implied by an ordered probit fitted on
the raw sample fraction. Changes in these transformed health measures are then regressed via OLS on
constructed wealth shocks and controls. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008) refer to this as ’probit-
adapted OLS’.
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and lung disease. These health conditions are also analyzed in separate regressions. In
theory the wording of the question only allows for new ever-diagnosed conditions to appear
but never to disappear. In the data, however, a significant number of people report a con-
dition in one wave but neglects the same condition in a future wave. Including these cases
tends to increase the significance of the results. It is therefore likely that such ’wrong’
answers are not mere noisy but contain information about actual or perceived changes in
the respondent’s health. Individuals might understand the question wrongly (overlooking
the ’ever’) or repress the memory of a cured disease. One should therefore be aware that
at least for a fraction of respondents these questions only indicate the current prevalence
of a condition.
For self-reported health respondents are asked to rate their current health as poor, fair,
good, very good or excellent. An additional question, self-reported changes in health, asks
whether compared to the previous interview health is worse, the same, or better. Self-
reported changes in health are regressed directly in levels and not in first differences as
the question already implies a health change.
The mental health index sums a subset of eight questions from the 20 question CES-D
depression score, which has been developed to diagnose clinical depression. Six questions
indicate whether the respondent experienced the following emotions all or most of the
time during the past week: felt depressed, everything is an effort, sleep is restless, felt
alone, felt sad, and could not get going. Two questions, that are subtracted from the
index, indicate whether the respondent felt happy and enjoyed life, all or most of the time
during the past week. Like the physical health index, the mental health index is inverted
for regressions so that higher values indicate better mental health.
Deaths of survey participants are documented in so-called exit surveys in which a proxy
respondent (usually a surviving family member) is interviewed about time and circum-
stances of the death. Thus deaths are well documented and not just one possible reason
for an observed panel attrition. ’Survival’, used as the dependent variable in the base-
line regressions, indicates whether the respondent survives until the next interview. This
means that survival from t to t+1 is regressed on wealth shocks from t-1 to t. Therefore
only individuals up to wave 9as can be included in the survival regressions.
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4 Empirical Specification
The identification strategy outlined above leads to the following empirical specification:
∆Hi,t = α+ β
sh(i),t−1
Wh(i),t−1
∆SPm(i,t)
SPm(i,t−1)
+ γ
sh(i),t−1
Wh(i),t−1
+ ϑt + δXi,t + i,t (5)
with indices:
i: Individual
h(i): Household of (i)
t: HRS wave (biannual)
m(i, t): Month of the interview of individual (i) in wave (t)
and variables:
∆Hi,t: Health outcomes
SP : Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index
st−1: Lagged stock holdings
Wt−1: Lagged life-time wealth
ϑt: Year dummies
Xi,t: Demographic controls: Dummies for gender (1), age group (12), cohort (10), race
(2), degree (4), lagged region (4), and lagged marital status (7).
Changes in different health measures are regressed via OLS on the interaction of stock
market changes with the lagged fraction of life-time wealth held in stocks (constructed
wealth shocks) while controlling separately for the ’main effects’, i.e. the lagged stock
fraction and year dummies. I can additionally include the exact stock market change
(which differs across individuals within the same year) and a dummy for no stock hold-
ings to control for the main effects in a more flexible way. Including a full set of year x
month dummies instead of year dummies leads to very similar results. Health outcomes
and demographics vary at the individual level, wealth at the household level and the stock
market at the monthly level. Standard errors are multi-level clustered by households and
interview month (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2011).
Predetermined demographic controls such as age, gender, race or lagged martial status
may be included to decrease the variance of the regression residual and thereby increase
the precision of the estimates. The inclusion of demographic controls should not change
the point estimate of constructed wealth shocks if the latter are (conditionally) indepen-
dent.
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5 Findings
5.1 Predictive power of constructed wealth shocks
Constructed wealth shocks are highly predictive of changes in reported wealth. As reported
in column (1) of Table 2 the regression of changes in reported wealth on constructed wealth
shocks and controls yields a highly significant coefficient of about 0.82. Including a large
number of demographic controls hardly affects the estimate, resulting in a coefficient of
0.79. This means that a constructed wealth shock of 10% corresponds to a change in
reported wealth by about 8%. As argued above, retirees are likely to adapt their con-
sumption to wealth shocks. The estimated coefficient suggests that out of a 10% wealth
shock 2% goes into consumption.13 In column (3) and (4) of Table 2 the exact stock frac-
tion is substituted by a dummy for stock holdings. Again stock market changes are highly
predictive of wealth changes for those with stocks. A 10% change in the stock market
leads to a 2.1% change in the wealth of stock holders.
Notice that the stock market effect on those without stocks (i.e. the coefficient on ’stock
market change’) is small and not significantly different from zero in all four columns of
Table 2. This gives further support to the conclusion of Figure 1, that there is not much
of an effect of the stock market cycle on the wealth of retirees without stocks. Further,
the R2 is extremely low despite the inclusion of a broad set of demographic controls. This
indicates that reported wealth in first differences is a noisy measure. Despite this noise
constructed wealth shocks do a good job in picking up actual changes in reported wealth.
Let us now turn to the effects of these wealth shocks on health outcomes.
5.2 Effects of wealth shocks on health outcomes
Table 3 reports the baseline regressions of five health measures (rows) on constructed
wealth shocks. Regressions in column (1) include as controls only the main effects, i.e.
the lagged fraction of wealth held in stocks, a dummy for lagged stock ownership, the
stock market change and year fixed effects. In column (2) a broad set of demographics
is added. In column (3) dependent variables are standardized using Probit-adapted OLS
so that estimates are in terms of standard deviations and thus comparable across health
measures (see Data section). All estimates displayed in this and the following tables refer
to the coefficient on constructed wealth shocks. A positive coefficient refers to a health
improvement in the respective measure.
The regressions in the first column indicate a positive effect of constructed wealth shocks
on all five health measures, ranging from 0.082 to 0.254. The effect is significantly different
13This implies a propensity to consume out of stock wealth of 20%. Compared to the literature that
has found estimates ranging from 1-5% this seem very large (Poterba 2000). A possible explanation could
be the old age of the sample. Consumption smoothing implies that the propensity to consume out of a
given wealth shock increases with age. If you have less years to live a given shock has to be smoothed over
fewer years. But the coefficient on wealth shocks might also be attenuated due to measurement error in
the lagged stock fraction. The 20% estimate should probably not be overinterpreted.
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from zero for all measures except for the self-reported change in health. Including a broad
set of demographic controls in column (2) hardly changes any of the coefficients. This
provides confidence that constructed wealth shocks are independent of unobserved hetero-
geneity. If the estimates were strongly affected by the inclusion of predetermined controls
we should be worried about the exogeneity of constructed wealth shocks. The estimated
effect on the physical health index indicates that a negative 10% wealth shock is associ-
ated with a deterioration of the index by about 0.025 units. In other words, among 40
retirees losing 10% of their life-time wealth one will develop an additional physical health
condition. The effect on survival suggests that among 100 retirees suffering a 10% wealth
shock there will be one additional death within the following two years. The estimates
in column (3) show that in terms of standard deviations the significant effects are quite
similar across health measures, ranging from 0.2 to 0.3.
In Table 4 I repeat these regressions separately for the seven health conditions from the
physical health index. As in the previous regressions, all health conditions are trans-
formed such that positive coefficients indicate a health improvement (i.e. a lower chance
to develop the respective health condition). A problem of the analysis of various health
conditions is that the chance of wrongly rejecting the null increases with every additional
regression.14 In the present setup, however, significant estimates would be more plausi-
ble for some health conditions than for others. Health changes are regressed on wealth
shocks over a period of on average two years. Therefore estimated health shocks must
be driven by diseases that are responsive to environmental factors and that do not take
a lot of time to develop. The regressions in Table 4 reveal a strongly positive effect of
wealth shocks on high blood pressure, a smaller effect on heart disease, but no significant
effect on other health conditions. For arthritis, cancer, diabetes and lung disease there
is also no joined significance in SUR models, neither for pairs nor for groups of three or
four conditions. As in the regressions for health measures the inclusion of demographic
controls hardly changes estimates. Standardized effects in column (3) further show that
this overall pattern is not driven by differences in the baseline rate of these different health
conditions, since effects are strongest for hypertension also in terms of standard deviations.
These heterogeneous effects across different physical health conditions are plausible (for a
medical text book describing these conditions see Fauci et al. 2011). High blood pressure
is the most responsive health problem in the short run and arises from both psychological
stress as well as unhealthy nutrition and behavior. Moreover, high blood pressure is a
cause for heart problems, so that a significant effect on heart problems is what one should
expect given the strong effect on high blood pressure. Similarly, one might expect an
effect on strokes, a condition that is caused by high blood pressure, too. Indeed, a slightly
significant effect on strokes appears in some specifications but this effect is not robust.
One reason might be that strokes are often fatal so that respondents decease before they
could report this condition. In line with this reasoning the summary statistics in Table
14In general one can correct for this problem by either reducing the number of tests (as done above by
summarizing conditions into one index) or by adjusting p-values (Anderson 2008).
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A.3 show that strokes are the least observed condition even though strokes are among the
leading causes of death (Fauci et al. 2011).
Effects on arthritis, diabetes, lung diseases or cancer would be less plausible. Arthritis is
a chronic condition that takes more than a few years to develop and is unlikely to respond
to psychological stress. Diabetes is driven by genetic disposition as well as by obesity.
One could think of a response in body weight to stress, but such an indirect effect might
take more than 1-2 years. And I do not find an effect of wealth shocks on body weight.
Lung diseases are typically driven by smoking or unhealthy environments at work and take
a long time to develop. Regarding cancer there is a psycho-medical literature discussing
stress as a potential cause, but such effects remain highly controversial (Chida et al. 2008).
Looking at individual depression symptoms from the mental health index does not re-
veal a single driver such as hypertension for the physical health index (results reported in
the Appendix, Table A.4). This is plausible. The mental health index does not represent
a list of different diseases but a collection of symptoms associated with clinical depression.
Any single symptom is not necessarily a sign of depression but what makes it a mental
health problem is having many of the symptoms at the same time.
Note that the effect on the two-year survival rate in Table 3 is exactly what we should
expect given the effects on mental health and in particular on high blood pressure. High
blood pressure related health problems are the leading cause of death in the Western world
(Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). And the sample of analyzed elderly, with aver-
age age 75, is already at the margin of death. 12% of the sample respondents do not survive
the following two years (Table A.3; this death rate is also in line with US life tables). So
it does not take a massive effect on latent health for them to be pushed over this threshold.
5.3 Effects by age, gender and degree of stock market exposure
Table 5 investigates the heterogeneity of effects across age and gender. The coefficients
of wealth shocks interacted with the respective categories are displayed as well as the sig-
nificance level of their difference. Overall, interaction terms are not estimated with much
precision which is not surprising given that estimates in the overall sample are already
quite noisy. But the effect heterogeneities that are strong enough to be detected are plau-
sible.
The age interactions are strongly different in the survival regression. Wealth shocks affect
survival rates for the elderly six times as much as for the younger group. The effect on the
physical health index shows up with a similar age pattern. Effects are twice as large for
the elderly. These differences are not significant, but the joint hypothesis of equality in
both the survival and the health conditions regression can be rejected at the 5% level. For
self-reported health and mental health no clear age differential arises. This pattern across
16
health measures makes sense. Both mortality and health conditions show up in the data
only if an individual is pushed over a certain health threshold. As the health distribution
shifts with age towards worse health the density around this threshold increases with age.
This means that we should observe a larger effect on mortality and health conditions for
the elderly even if the effect on latent health is the same across age groups. Mental and
self-reported health, on the other hand, are more continuous so that health deterioration
over age does not automatically imply stronger effects on these measures.
There are no significant gender differences. Mental and self-reported health seem to be
more affected for women which would be in line with the literature on gender differences
in mental health but the estimated differentials are imprecise. These results do not imply
that effects are the same for males and females but it seems that estimates are not driven
by gender.
Table 6 explores the linearity of the effects. Instead of interacting stock market changes
with the exact fraction of wealth held in stocks I include interaction terms with dummies
indicating 1-10% and >10% wealth in stocks, respectively. If stock market effects increase
with wealth held in stocks (i.e. stock market exposure) effects should be stronger for the
latter interaction term. This is what the results in Table 6 indicate. Stock market changes
affect retirees with more than 10% wealth in stocks two to eight times as much as re-
tirees with 1-10% in stocks. Estimated effects for the latter group are small and therefore
not significantly different from zero in most cases, but point estimates are positive for all
health measures. Importantly, there is no effect of the stock market on retirees without
stocks, as indicated by the coefficient on the stock market change main effect.
5.4 Are the effects of wealth shock on health outcomes causal?
The estimation results in Tables 3 to 6 show strong, robust and plausible effects of con-
structed wealth shock on physical and mental health outcomes of elderly retirees in the
US. Since the empirical strategy exploits the randomness inherent in the stock market,
interacted with the degree to which individuals hold retirement wealth in stocks, there is
reason to believe that estimated effects are not simply driven by selection but reflecting
a causal relationship. However, there are some alternative stories one could think of and
ways to test them in the data.
One worry might be that the stock market correlates coincidentally with health profiles
of those retirees who tend to hold a lot of stocks. A brief look at the stock market de-
velopment over the observations period in Figure 1 suggests that this is unlikely to be
the case. Positive and negative stock market changes follow each other and it is hard to
imagine that health profiles of stock holders just happen to follow these ups and downs
by chance. However, retirees with a lot of stocks might be more affected by the overall
business cycle regardless of their stock market investment, for example if they tend to
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follow the news more closely and worry more about the country’s economic future than
retirees without stocks. I can test this hypothesis in the data by interacting stock holdings
with the overall unemployment rate which reflects the business cycle better than the stock
market. Alternatively, the stock market might for some reason affect wealthy retirees more
than poorer retirees, regardless of actual stock holdings. To test this I interact the stock
market change with the wealth fraction held in bonds, since wealthy retirees tend to hold
larger fractions of their wealth both in stocks and bonds. Table 8 shows regressions with
these two types of ’placebo shocks’. Despite the strong collinearity with the constructed
wealth shock the placebo shocks do not consistently affect health outcomes when included
separately. And the original wealth shock effect is robust and remains largely unchanged
when I include all three shocks in horse race regressions in the third column of Table 8.
Another concern might be that retirees with the same fraction of wealth held in stocks at
different points in the stock market cycle are not comparable. A retiree with 20% wealth
in stocks at the beginning of a boom might be different from a retiree with 20% in stocks
right before a crash. The observation period covers only a limited number of stock market
changes so that there could be a spurious correlation of stock market changes with the type
of investor. Also, individuals do not rebalance portfolios continuously. So a retiree with
20% in stocks who does not rebalance her portfolio will end up with 33% in stocks when
the stock market doubles. One way to rule out such correlation of the stock market cycle
with the type of investor as a potential driver is to instrument actual stock holdings with
individuals’ initial stock holdings in the first period. Initial stock holdings are constant
over time for a given individual. Hence they are uncorrelated with where we are in the
stock market cycle. Table A shows results from such 2SLS regressions. Point estimates
and significance levels vary slightly compared to the baseline specification, but despite the
loss of precision implied by this IV strategy the overall effect pattern carries over to this
IV specification.
An alternative way to check whether estimated effects are driven by changes in investor
types is the inclusion of predetermined demographic controls (Altonji et al. 2005). If the
relationship of health changes and constructed wealth shock is driven by changes in the
type of investors then the inclusion of controls like gender, age, education, and region
of residence should change the coefficient on wealth shocks. As the comparison of the
estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Tables 3 and 4 has shown, adding a wide range of
demographic controls to the baseline specification hardly changes any of the estimates.
But the included demographic controls might just be poorly measured proxies of the ac-
tual confounders. As Pischke and Schwandt (2012) show a more sensitive test to detect
selection in the presence of measurement error is the inclusion of individual controls as
dependent variable on the left-hand side of the regression equation. Table A.6 shows that
none of these balancing regressions for various socio-economic controls yields significant
wealth shock effects.
To sum up, it seems unlikely that a correlation of the stock market cycle with investors’
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health profiles or with investor types is driving the results. Notice that there is also no
direct effect of the stock market on retirees without stocks, neither on wealth (Table 2) nor
on health outcomes (Table 6). This suggests that constructed wealth shocks are indeed
causing the observed changes in health and that effects are mainly running through stock
wealth.
5.5 Effect size
How large are the estimated effects? A good way to assess the effect size is the comparison
with the cross-sectional relationship of wealth and health. Regressing health on wealth in
levels does not allow for a causal interpretation as the coefficient on wealth also reflects
reverse causality and omitted third factors. But one would expect such endogeneity to
bias the coefficient upwards. Such benchmark regressions provide an upper bound for the
average causal effect of wealth on health in the sample, in particular if few additional
controls are included.
Tables 8 and 9 compare the baseline effects of wealth shocks in column (1) with the
cross-sectional relationship of health and ln household wealth in column (2). Column (3)
shows the association of ln wealth with the change in health measures. There is only one
benchmark estimate for self-reported changes in health and survival since these measures
already refer to a health change. The estimates in the first two columns in Table 8 suggest
that wealth shock effects on the physical health index and on self-reported health is of
similar size as the cross-sectional relationship but it is 1.5 and 3 times larger for mental
health and the survival probability, respectively. With respect to the physical health index
this means that a 10% negative wealth shock leads to a similarly large health decline as the
health gap that is associated with a 10% wealth difference in the data. Lose 10% of your
life-time wealth as an elderly retiree in the stock market and you end up with a similar
score on the physical health index as your neighbor who has been 10% poorer before.
Benchmark regressions for individual health conditions in Table 9 indicate that this is
not yetthe whole story. While wealth shocks affect only particular conditions the cross-
sectional wealth gradient is strongly significant and of similar size for all health conditions,
except for cancer.15 And for hypertension and heart disease the wealth shock effect is about
twice the size of the benchmark gradient. This means that after a stock market induced
wealth loss you will suffer more from hypertension and related diseases than your ex-ante
poorer neighbor. But your neighbor is still more likely to have arthritis, diabetes and lung
disease.
The differences between the baseline and cross-sectional estimates suggest that the ef-
fects of wealth shocks are different from the average causal effects of wealth on health in
the sample. This seems plausible. Someone owning $500k can afford better health care
15For cancer the gradient is inverted meaning that richer people are more likely to have cancer. This
reversal has been documented in other data sets but is so far largely unexplained.
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and healthier consumption than somebody owning $300k which over time accumulates
to a better health stock. This however is a different effect from losing $200k in a stock
market crash, which involves high blood pressure and psychological factors such as stress
and depression rather than just a slight change in health inputs. In light of the difference
between these strong short-term effects and smaller but accumulating long-term effects of
wealth differences the small coefficient in the survival benchmark regression makes sense.
Survival does not contain any accumulated effect because those who died before are not
observed. An elderly retiree who loses a lot of retirement wealth in the stock market
will have a lower survival probability than the ex-ante poorer neighbor – given that this
neighbor is still alive.
Notice that the comparison with the cross-section also provides further confidence that
my estimates are not driven by a coincidental correlation of the stock market with the
socio-economic status of stock market investors. If this were the case, we should observe a
similar pattern of effects across health conditions as in the benchmark regressions. But the
pattern is clearly different. Still one might worry that effects are driven by a correlation
with the typical health profiles of investors. Possibly at older ages richer people tend to
get more hypertension and related diseases simply because they have done well at younger
ages. Column (3) in Tables 8 and 9 show the benchmark regressions of health changes on
wealth levels. Again the pattern in these regressions is very different from the estimated
wealth shock effects.
Another important effect size comparison are estimates from the existing literature. In
an influential study, Smith (2005) uses a sample of employed individuals from the HRS
and shows that changes in stock wealth conditional on socio-demographic controls do not
correlate with changes in health. Since my sample consists of retirees with average age
75, these findings for employed individuals do not contradict my results. It is worth not-
ing, however, that I obtain similar zero results as Smith (2005) if I substitute constructed
wealth shocks by reported changes in stock wealth (Table A.7). These findings of zero
effects are interesting because we would expect potential endogeneity left in stock wealth
changes to bias the estimate up and not towards zero. A more severe problem than po-
tential endogeneity – in particular for elderly retirees – might be measurement error in
reported stock wealth. Regressions in Table 2 have shown that changes in overall wealth
are quite noisy and this is likely to be the case as well for changes in stock wealth.
Another influential study using HRS data is Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill and Ribeiro
(2003). These authors develop an innovative approach related to Granger causality and
find that lagged wealth conditional on a broad set of socio-economic variables is not
Granger-causing changes in health for almost all health measures in the HRS. However,
in a recent study Stowasser, Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2011) repeat the analysis of
Adams et al. (2003) using the full range of data available in the HRS. In these extended
data they reject Granger causality only for three out of 40 health conditions: for cancer,
female lung disease and male hypertension. The rejection for hypertension, the condition
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for which I find strongest effects, could be explained by contemporaneous wealth shock
effects. The approach of Adams et al. (2003) tests for a causal effect of lagged wealth on
health changes. If it does not take long for hypertension to respond to a wealth shock then
a lagged wealth shock might already affect lagged hypertension and no effect would be
left in the first difference. If effects are not permanent, this could even imply an inverted
effect on the first difference.
5.6 Alternative sample specifications and 2SLS regressions
Regressions in Table 10 show that results are robust against various changes in the sample
specification. In column (2) all financial respondents and their spouses regardless of their
employment status are included as long as some kind of retirement income is reported for
the household. This increases the sample size by more than 50%, but coefficients remain
largely the same. In column (3) only households are included in which both spouses are
above age 64. This rules out the possibility that results are driven by the group of pre-
retirement age pensioners who are typically selected into the sample through bad health.
In column (4) only single households are included. In the final column the bottom quar-
tile from the life-time wealth distribution is excluded, which again changes estimates only
slightly.
In the baseline specification I regress changes in health directly on constructed wealth
shocks. An alternative specification is a two-stage least squares regression with constructed
wealth shocks as an instrumental variable (IV) for changes in reported wealth. In terms
of an IV setup the baseline specification refers to the reduced form while the regression
of reported wealth changes on wealth shocks reported in Table 2 is the first stage. Since
the first stage coefficient in Table 2 is smaller one and the IV estimate equals the reduced
form estimate divided by the first stage, we should expect a 2SLS estimation to inflate
coefficients. The coefficients reported in Table 11 indeed are about 25% above the baseline
estimates for each health measure.
Which estimate is more relevant, the IV or the 2SLS estimate? The 2SLS specifica-
tion provides us with estimates that are scaled in terms of the average change in reported
wealth associated with a given constructed wealth shock. But reported wealth is net of
consumption. And as people tend to adapt their consumption to wealth shocks, changes in
reported wealth tend to be systematically smaller than the original wealth shock. Hence
changes in reported wealth are the residual change after smoothing, while constructed
wealth shocks are a direct proxy for the actual wealth shock. From a policy perspective
we are interested in estimates in terms of the actual wealth shock and not in terms of the
wealth change that remains after people have adapted their consumption. This is why I
choose the reduced from as the baseline regression.
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5.7 Nutrition and health inputs
As discussed in the introduction calorie intake and health inputs are central mechanisms
through which wealth affects health in poor countries ((Jensen and Richter 2003, Case
2004) but they might be less relevant for wealthy retirees in the US The HRS reports re-
spondents’ body mass index (BMI) and the number of doctor visits as well as out-of-pocket
medical expenditure (OOP) which allows to directly test for the role of these potential
mechanisms. Table A.8 in the Appendix shows that indeed wealth shocks do not signifi-
cantly affect any of these three measures.
Notice, however, that there could be opposing effects at work that might cancel out in the
regression. People might be cutting back on food expenditures as a response to a negative
wealth shock. But ’cheaper calories’ often come in the form of inferior food that remains
stored in body fat to a greater extent than higher quality food. In this case cutting back
on food expenditure might even increase people’s BMI. The effect on health inputs is
ambiguous, too. If wealth shocks make you sick you might end up going more not less to
the doctor, even if this might imply higher OOP expenditures, e.g. because a premium
health care coverage is not affordable anymore. Hence, the results in Table A.8 should
not be interpreted as evidence that wealth shocks do not affect people’s nutrition behavior
or the optimal receipt of health inputs. However, it seems unlikely that these are the
main mechanisms underlying the strong short-term effects of wealth shocks on physical
and mental health that we observe in the data.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that wealth shocks have strongly positive effects on health
outcomes of stock holding retirees in the US. A 10% wealth shock is associated with an im-
provement of 2-3% of a standard deviation in physical health, self-reported health, mental
health and survival rates. Analyzing individual health conditions I find a strong effect on
high blood pressure, smaller effects on heart diseases and no effect on arthritis, diabetes,
lung disease and cancer. The analysis of interaction terms reveals that effects on physical
health and mortality increase with age. The comparison with the cross-sectional relation-
ship of wealth and health indicates that the estimated causal effects of wealth shocks are
larger than the long-run wealth elasticity of health.
So far positive effects of wealth shocks on elderly health have been found only for poor
retirees in Russia and South Africa. This paper is the first to document such effects for
wealthy retirees in a wealthy country. I uncover these effects with a new measure to iden-
tify stock market fluctuations in the wealth of US retirees. This measure, the interaction
of stock holdings with stock market changes, is of interest beyond the context of health
economics. It could also be used to study, for example, the effects of unearned income on
labor supply, savings and in particular on consumption.16
16See Coile and Levine (2006) for a study that uses a similar approach to analyze the effects of stock
market movements on retirement (as discussed above).
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The pattern of affected health conditions found in this study point to a story in which
psychological factors play an important role. Psychological factors as central mechanism
linking economic shocks and health outcomes are in line with the results of Sullivan and
von Wachter (2008). They find strong mortality effects of lay-offs for displaced workers
in the US and argue that psychological reactions are the most likely mechanism under-
lying these effects. These could be psychological reactions to the arrival of news about
future consumption as well as reactions to actual changes in consumption. Applying the
empirical strategy developed in this paper to data sets that allow to study consumption be-
havior in detail would be a promising path for future research. Of particular use would be
consumption data in combination with information on individual stock portfolio composi-
tions. Precise information on individual stock holdings allows to construct high-frequency
individual-specific wealth shocks which would greatly increase the power of such analysis
without the need of extended time series of stock market changes.
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8 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Changes in Reported Wealth and the S&P500
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Average changes in reported wealth excluding housing wealth for retiree households with and without stocks
in the previous period are plotted per HRS wave. The length of the bars indicates the time period in each
wave over which interviews were conducted, as indicated by the bold sections of the S&P500 plot. There are
more interviews at the beginning of each wave. Hence, in the last wave the majority of households faces a
lower S&P500 than at the previous interview, in line with the average negative change in reported wealth (see
also Figure 2). For further details on wealth measures and sample restrictions see the Data section.
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Figure 2: Constructed Wealth Shocks and the S&P500
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Constructed wealth shocks are plotted over time with the S&P500. Each circle represents the constructed
wealth shock of one household and is placed in the figure at the exact month of the household’s interview in
t.
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Table 2: Regressions of Changes in Reported Wealth on Constructed Wealth Shocks.
Dependent Variable:
Wealth change (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constructed wealth shock 0.819*** 0.793***
= %Wealth in stocks[t-1] (0.173) (0.175)
x Stock market change
D(Any stocks[t-1]) 0.214*** 0.213***
x Stock market change (0.041) (0.041)
Stock market change 0.057 0.041 0.045 0.029
(0.127) (0.126) (0.128) (0.128)
Main effects X X X X
Demographic controls X X
n 31,673 31,673 31,673 31,673
R2 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.009
The dependent variable is the percentage change in life-time wealth. ’D(Any stocks[t-
1])’ is a dummy indicating stock ownership in the previous wave. Main effects are the
interaction terms and year dummies. Demographic controls are dummies for gender
(1), age group (12), cohort (10), race (2), region (4), degree (4), and lagged marital
status (7). Regressions include only one observation per household and year. For
details on wealth measures see the Data section. Standard errors in parenthesis are
multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
29
Table 3: Baseline Regressions of Health Measures on Wealth Shocks
Dependent variable OLS OLS Probit-adapted OLS
(∆ > 0: Health improvement) (1) (2) (3)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.254*** 0.252*** 0.192***
n=35,739 (0.082) (0.082) (0.063)
∆ Self-reported Health 0.231* 0.252** 0.205*
n=41,693 (0.123) (0.123) (0.107)
Self-reported Change in Health 0.082 0.095 0.138
n=41,693 (0.080) (0.084) (0.122)
∆ Mental Health Index 0.645** 0.664*** 0.298**
n=37,034 (0.252) (0.253) (0.130)
Survival 0.087* 0.109** 0.208**
n=34,380 (0.049) (0.047) (0.089)
Main effects X X X
Demographic controls X X
Standardized dependent variable X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks (’%wealth in stocks[t-1] x stock market change’) is
displayed. A positive coefficient refers to a health improvement. ’Survival’ indicates survival to the
next wave (on average 2 years), thus not including respondents in the last wave. ’Probit-adapted
OLS’ yields effects in terms of standard deviations that are comparable across health measures.
’Main effects’ are the lagged fraction of wealth held in stocks, a dummy for lagged stock ownership,
the stock market change and year dummies. ’Demographic controls’ are dummies for gender (1),
age group (12), cohort (10), race (2), region (4), degree (4), and lagged marital status (7). Standard
errors in parenthesis are multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
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Table 4: Baseline Regressions of Health Conditions on Wealth Shocks
Dependent variable OLS OLS Probit-adapted OLS
(∆ > 0: Health improvement) (1) (2) (3)
∆ High blood pressure 0.109*** 0.107*** 0.172***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.063)
∆ Heart disease 0.066* 0.067* 0.115*
(0.036) (0.036) (0.062)
∆ Stroke 0.011 0.013 0.028
(0.025) (0.025) (0.052)
∆ Diabetes -0.001 -0.005 -0.010
(0.023) (0.024) (0.042)
∆ Cancer 0.028 0.029 0.055
(0.020) (0.020) (0.038)
∆ Arthritis 0.040 0.039 0.063
(0.046) (0.046) (0.074)
∆ Lung disease 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.021) (0.021) (0.041)
Main effects X X X
Demographic controls X X
Standardized dep. var. X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks (’%wealth in stocks[t-1] x stock market change’) is dis-
played. A positive coefficient refers to a health improvement in the respective dependent variable.
Column (3) shows effects in terms of standard deviations that are comparable across health condi-
tions.’Main effects’ and ’Demographic controls’ as in the previous table. N=35,739 in all regressions.
Standard errors in parenthesis are multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
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Table 5: Regressions of Health Measures on Wealth Shocks Interacted with Age and
Gender
Interaction category
Age Gender
∆ ∆
<75 >=75 p-value Male Female p-value
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.152 0.313*** 0.346 0.264* 0.236*** 0.875
(0.145) (0.094) (0.156) (0.087)
∆ Self-reported Health 0.339* 0.193 0.543 0.118 0.319* 0.535
(0.182) (0.162) (0.232) (0.176)
Self-reported ∆ Health 0.213* 0.013 0.176 0.019 0.151 0.367
(0.120) (0.111) (0.113) (0.110)
∆ Mental Health Index 0.953*** 0.490 0.321 0.250 0.940** 0.181
(0.354) (0.335) (0.335) (0.366)
Survival 0.014 0.171*** 0.022 0.119* 0.103** 0.824
(0.049) (0.062) (0.070) (0.048)
Controls (interacted)
Main effects X X
Demographics X X
The coefficients on constructed wealth shocks interacted with the two respective subgroups are displayed.
’∆ (p-value)’ indicates the significance level of the difference between the two interacted coefficients.
Positive coefficients refer to a health improvement in the respective dependent variable. Numbers of
observations and (interacted) controls as in Table 3. The estimation method used is OLS. Standard
errors in parenthesis are multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
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Table 6: Linearity of Wealth Shock Effects
∆ Physical ∆ Self-rep. Self-rep. ∆ Mental
Dependent Variable H Index Health ∆ Health H Index Survival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Stock market change -0.045 0.017 0.014 0.057 -0.016
(reference group) 0.036 0.062 0.035 0.156 0.024
D(1-10% stocks[t-1]) 0.075* 0.030 0.063 0.034 0.006
x Stock market change (0.044) (0.080) (0.047) (0.097) (0.019)
D(>10% stocks[t-1]) 0.136*** 0.068 0.027 0.240** 0.039**
x Stock market change (0.029) (0.045) (0.025) (0.108) (0.018)
Main effects X X X X X
Demographic controls X X X X X
Coefficients of the interaction of stock market changes with dummies for lagged stock holding levels
are displayed. Main effects: Dummies 1-10% and >10% wealth held in stocks in t-1 and year fixed
effects. Demographic controls and numbers of observations as in Table 3. Standard errors are
multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
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Table 7: Inclusion of Placebo Shocks (Unemployment Rate Changes and Bond Holdings)
Baseline Placebo u-rate Placebo bond Horse race
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: ∆ Index of Health Conditions
Wealth shock 0.252*** 0.295**
(0.082) (0.151)
Placebo u-rate shock -0.096 0.023
(0.062) (0.117)
Placebo bond shock -0.519 -0.635*
(0.388) (0.386)
Dep. var.: ∆ Self-reported Health
Wealth shock 0.252** 0.218
(0.123) (0.213)
Placebo u-rate shock -0.210*** -0.036
(0.079) (0.162)
Placebo bond shock -0.020 -0.155
(0.625) (0.631)
Dep. var.: Self-reported Change in Health
Wealth shock 0.095 -0.076
(0.084) (0.125)
Placebo u-rate shock -0.056 -0.162
(0.073) (0.119)
Placebo bond shock 0.120 0.079
(0.277) (0.280)
Dep. var.: ∆ Mental Health Index
Wealth shock 0.664*** 1.035***
(0.253) (0.327)
Placebo u-rate shock -0.163 0.392*
(0.164) (0.219)
Placebo bond shock 1.990** 1.625*
(0.935) (0.958)
Dep. var.: Survival
Wealth shock 0.109** 0.188*
(0.047) (0.100)
Placebo u-rate shock 0.000 0.090
(0.052) (0.108)
Placebo bond shock 0.106 0.071
(0.170) (0.168)
Main effects X X X X
Demographic controls X X X X
Wealth shocks: %wealth in stocks[t-1] x stock market change. Placebo u-rate shock: %wealth in
stocks[t-1] x unemployment rate change. Placebo bond shock: %wealth in bonds[t-1] x stock market
change. Main effects, demographic controls and numbers of observations as in Table 3. Standard
errors are multi-level clustered by household and interview month.
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Table 8: Benchmark Regressions of Health Measures on Ln of Life-time Wealth
Baseline Benchmark
∆Hi,t on Hi,t on ∆Hi,t on
∆S&Pt
S&Pt−1
si,t−1
Wi,t−1 lnWi,t lnWi,t
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.252*** 0.211*** 0.001
(0.082) (0.013) (0.004)
∆ Self-reported Health 0.252** 0.335*** -0.014***
(0.123) (0.009) (0.003)
Self-reported ∆ Health 0.095 0.040***
(0.084) (0.004)
∆ Mental Health Index 0.664*** 0.482*** -0.020***
(0.253) (0.017) (0.007)
Survival 0.109** 0.030***
(0.047) (0.002)
Main effects X
Demographics X
Male, age, cohort, region X X
Column (1) shows the baseline estimates as in Table 3. Columns (2) and (3) show
OLS regressions of health levels and health changes on ln life-time wealth, respectively.
There are no level equivalents for ’self-reported change in health’ and for ’survival’.
Only gender, age, cohort and region controls are included in (2) and (3), hence life-
time wealth proxies for overall socio-economic status. The inclusion of further controls
decreases the coefficients on ln life-time wealth.
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Table 9: Benchmark Regressions of Health Conditions on Ln of Life-time Wealth
Baseline Benchmark
∆Hi,t on Hi,t on ∆Hi,t on
Dependent variable Hi,t
∆S&Pt
S&Pt−1
si,t−1
Wi,t−1 lnWi,t lnWi,t
(Never had...) (1) (2) (3)
High blood pressure 0.107*** 0.048*** -0.002**
(0.039) (0.004) (0.001)
Heart disease 0.067* 0.028*** 0.000
(0.036) (0.004) (0.001)
Stroke 0.013 0.030*** 0.003***
(0.025) (0.003) (0.001
Arthritis 0.039 0.033*** -0.006***
(0.046) (0.004) (0.001)
Cancer 0.029 -0.024*** -0.001
(0.020) (0.004) (0.001)
Diabetes -0.005 0.060*** 0.005***
(0.024) (0.004) (0.001)
Lung disease 0.001 0.035*** 0.002**
(0.021) (0.003) (0.001)
Main effects X
Demographics X
Male, age, cohort, region X X
Column (1) shows the baseline estimates as in Table 4. Columns (2) and (3) show OLS
regressions of health condition levels and changes on ln life-time wealth, respectively.
Only gender, age, cohort and region controls are included in (2) and (3), hence life-
time wealth proxies for overall socio-economic status. The inclusion of further controls
decreases the coefficients on ln life-time wealth.
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Table 10: Alternative sample specifications
Including Excluding Singles Excluding
Baseline non-retirees HH<65 only poorest 25%
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.252*** 0.216*** 0.310*** 0.435*** 0.256***
(0.082) (0.080) (0.081) (0.114) (0.071)
n 35,739 55,061 28,286 17,095 25,930
∆ Self-reported Health 0.252** 0.203 0.260* 0.120 0.207
(0.123) (0.133) (0.136) (0.204) (0.134)
n 41,693 63,230 33,237 20,319 29,810
Self-reported ∆ Health 0.095 0.089 0.052 0.048 0.036
(0.084) (0.066) (0.097) (0.148) (0.094)
n 41,693 63,230 33,237 20,319 29,810
∆ Mental Health Index 0.664*** 0.438** 0.768** 0.815* 0.711***
(0.253) (0.221) (0.323) (0.481) (0.262)
n 37,034 56,892 29,240 17,747 27,450
Survival 0.109** 0.093*** 0.100** 0.122 0.113**
(0.047) (0.035) (0.050) (0.089) (0.049)
n 34,380 52,241 27,036 16,577 24,304
Main effects X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X
Comments as in as in Table 3. Column (2): non-retired individuals are included (as long as some kind
of retirement income is reported for HH). (3): HH are excluded if either financial respondent or spouse
or both are below age 65. (4): Only single HH included. (5): HH from quartile of the life-time wealth
distribution are excluded.
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Table 11: Constructed Wealth Shocks as Instrument for Changes in Reported Wealth
Baseline 2SLS
∆S&P500
S&P500
si,t−1
Wi,t−1 as regressor
∆S&P500
S&P500
si,t−1
Wi,t−1 as IV for
reported wealth changes
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.252*** 0.327***
(0.080) (0.123)
First stage F -statistic - 22.37
∆ Self-reported Health 0.252** 0.312**
(0.114) (0.154)
First stage F -statistic - 25.31
Self-reported Change in Health 0.095 0.118
(0.089) (0.107)
First stage F -statistic - 25.31
∆ Mental Health Index 0.664*** 0.780**
(0.219) (0.308)
First stage F -statistic - 21.21
Survival 0.109** 0.137**
(0.047) (0.066)
First stage F -statistic - 21.52
Main effects X X
Demographic controls X X
Column (1) displays the coefficients on constructed wealth shocks as in the Table 3. Column (2) displays
the 2SLS coefficients on changes in reported wealth with constructed wealth shocks as instrument. First-
stage F-statistics vary across health measures due to differences in the number of observations. For further
comments see Table 3.
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A Appendix
Figure A.1: HRS Expectations of an Increase in the Stock Market and the S&P500
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Monthly averages of the following question in the HRS are plotted: ’By next year at this time, what is the
percent chance that mutual fund shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average will be worth more than they are today?’ Averages for months with less than 25 responses are not
displayed.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics Demographic Controls
Variable Mean Std. dev. Variable Mean Std. dev.
Sex Education
Female 0.634 Years of education 11.659 3.390
Less than high school 0.316
Age GED diploma 0.045
Age 75.43 8.91 High-school graduate 0.324
Age>75 0.522 Some college 0.177
College and above 0.138
Race
White 0.823 Marital status (lagged)
African-American 0.142 Married 0.518
Partnered 0.016
Region Separated 0.013
Northeast 0.165 Divorced 0.079
Midwest 0.248 Separated/divorced 0.005
South 0.408 Widowed 0.329
West 0.179 Never married 0.032
Standard deviations are omitted for binary variables. Further comments as in Table 1.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics Wealth Measures
Symbol Mean Std. dev.
Wealth measure (1) (2) (3)
Reported household wealth (nominal USD) At 361,411 1,059,818
Change in reported household wealth (nominal USD) ∆At 10,347 988,519
Household life-time wealth (nominal USD) Wt 548,065 3,911,738
Relative change in reported household wealth ∆AtWt−1 0.111 0.995
Fraction of life-time wealth held in stocks stWt 0.064 0.145
Percentage change in the S&P500 S&PtS&Pt−1 0.049 0.223
Predicted wealth shocks st−1Wt−1
∆S&Pt
S&Pt−1 0.002 0.035
For comments on sample restrictions see Table 1.
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Table A.4: Regressions of Mental Health Index Items on Wealth Shocks
Dependent Variable
(∆ > 0: Mood improvement) (1) (2)
∆ Felt depressed 0.140* 0.143*
(0.077) (0.076)
∆ Felt sad 0.153** 0.154*
(0.078) (0.078)
∆ Everything is an effort 0.030 0.037
(0.083) (0.082)
∆ Sleep is restless 0.109 0.109
(0.087) (0.087)
∆ Felt alone 0.112 0.114
(0.071) (0.072)
∆ Could not get going 0.056 0.056
(0.068) (0.068)
∆ Felt happy -0.003 0.000
(0.068) (0.068)
∆ Enjoyed life 0.043 0.044
(0.054) (0.053)
Main effects X X
Demographic controls X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks is displayed. A positive coef-
ficient refers to an improvement in the respective dependent variable, e.g.
feeling less depressed or feeling more happy. Further comments as in Table 3.
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Table A.5: 2SLS Regressions with Initial Stock Holdings as Instrument for Actual Stock
Holdings
Baseline
∆S&Pt
S&Pt−1 [
si
Wi
]1998 as IV for
IV sample constructed wealth shocks
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
∆ Physical Health Index 0.252*** 0.303*** 0.392***
(0.080) (0.090) (0.128)
n 35,739 21,953 21,953
∆ Self-reported Health 0.252** 0.261** 0.135
(0.114) (0.120) (0.162)
n 41,693 25,969 25,969
Self-reported Change in Health 0.095 0.108 0.065
(0.089) (0.112) (0.141)
n 41,693 25,969 25,969
∆ Mental Health Index 0.664*** 0.456* 0.746***
(0.219) (0.248) (0.277)
n 37,034 22,761 22,761
Survival 0.109** 0.095* 0.052
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049)
n 34,380 22,814 22,814
Main effects X X X
Demographics X X X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks (’%wealth in stocks[t-1] x stock market change’) is
displayed. Column (1) shows the baseline results. Column (2) repeats the baseline regressions in
the IV sample. Column (3) reports coefficients from 2SLS regressions with wealth shocks based on
the 1998 fraction of wealth in stocks as instrument Further comments as in Table 3.
Table A.6: Balancing regressions
African- >12 years of Region
Dependent Variable Male American Age education Midwest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constructed wealth shock 0.002 -0.028 0.685 0.089 -0.005
(0.034) (0.021) (0.418) (0.088) (0.064)
Controls
Main effects X X X X X
Demographics (excl. dep. var.) X X X X X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks in baseline regressions with individual controls as
dependent variable is displayed. Demographic controls exclude (the category of) the dependent
variable. All further comments as in Table 3.
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Table A.8: Regressions of Potential Mechanisms on Wealth Shocks
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
∆ BMI -0.605 -0.554
(0.387) (0.399)
∆ Number doctor visits -0.032 -0.031
(0.035) (0.035)
∆ OOP expenditure 0.014 0.013
(0.012) (0.012)
Main effects X X
Demographic controls X X
The coefficient on constructed wealth shocks is displayed. BMI is the re-
spondent’s body mass index. Number doctor visits refers to the respondent’s
doctor visits since the past interview. OOP refers to out-of-pocket medical
expenditures. Further comments as in Table 3.
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